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Jürgen Mittelstrass
The Idea of The UnIversITy: 
hIsTory and faTe 
The intellectual situation of a society is reflected in its universities, 
and the development of modern science and education that is 
supported by science is reflected in the history of the university. At 
the university, science and education become institutionalised from 
the very beginning. Thus, it is correct to view Aristotle’s undertaking 
as the coming into being of the university.1 Whether in the form of a 
school, starting with the Platonic Academy and Aristotle’s peripatos, 
or in the form of an encyclopaedia, or later, of a monastery, science 
and education find their highest expression in the university. This is 
still true today despite strong competition from research institutions 
outside the university in the contemporary scientific world and the 
loosening of the connection between teaching and research in the 
modern mass-education university. All too often, the history of the 
university’s success is also a history of loss. This is also true of the 
history of the university between the 17th and the 19th century, when 
the medieval and early modern university was transformed into the 
university of today. The essential theory behind it was provided by 
Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt.
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1  Gilbert Ryle, ‘Plato ,ʼ The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, VI, ed. by Paul Edwards (New York, 
London: Macmillan, 1967), 333.
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From Leibniz via K ant to Humboldt
The early history of university reform is marked by its dissolution. 
In a theoretical framework it is reflected in the writings of Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz. According to him, the academy oriented to the 
Renaissance academies and the Royal Society (1660), the pre-history 
of which dates back to 1645, replaced the university. The guiding 
idea was to oppose a new institution – useful for the advancement 
of science and research – to the existing universities. Leibniz was 
thoroughly convinced that universities could not be transformed 
into modern research institutions, while also maintaining their 
educational function. Nevertheless, without intending to, his 
thoughts on science and education policy also prepared the ground 
for the new university. The fundamental ideas, which were later 
institutionally elaborated by Kant and Humboldt, include the concepts 
related to the system of science and the theory of education that 
were already formulated to great measure by Leibniz. All his plans 
were directed towards, or led to, the reorganisation of science and 
education. Examples include the following: his academy plans and 
his encyclopaedia projects; his plan for a mathesis universalis (aimed 
at logically and methodologically unifying knowledge); a universal 
language of science as the medium for a future (European) republic 
of scholars; his efforts to reorganise the book trade and teaching; as 
well as his policies related to religion and Europe. The university 
was missing from these plans, but it must have been clear to Leibniz, 
that in this context, it could not be dispensed with in the long run.
This is where Kant’s reflections come in. The background for 
this is the development of the university guided by the ideas of the 
Enlightenment, particularly at the universities of Halle and Göttingen. 
Not only the history of the Enlightenment, but also history of the 
university, were made there. Therefore, in contrast to the negative 
estimation of Leibniz, the importance of the university increased, 
but the programme and reality still remained far apart. This is also 
obvious in Kant’s penetrating analysis on The Conflict of the Faculties 
(1798), which may, on one hand, be a particularly impressive example 
of what Hegel, referring to Kant, calls ‘the Enlightenment made 
methodical’ (die methodisch gemachte Aufklärung2), and on the other, 
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. by 
Hermann Glockner. Sämtliche Werke, XIX (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1928), 554.
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can be seen as a passionate plea for the university as a house of 
research and enlightenment, expressed in the form of a theory on 
the faculty of philosophy.3
According to Kant, the ‘idea of the university’ (already present in 
the preliminary studies for the Conflict4) is a philosophical idea. The 
bearer of this idea is the faculty of philosophy, since only this faculty 
is concerned with scientific truth, and therefore, with the essential 
idea of science. The self-confident declaration reads: ‘A university 
must have a faculty of philosophy. Its function in relation to the three 
higher faculties is to control them and, in this way, be useful to them, 
since truth (the essential and first condition of learning in general) 
is the main thing, whereas the utility the higher faculties promise 
the government is of secondary importance.ʼ5 According to Kant, 
the knowledge of the faculty of philosophy takes into account the 
knowledge of the other faculties (theology, medicine, law). However, 
not in terms of content, but as ‘the objects it will examine and criticise’,6 
and not in a propaedeutic role, but with a view to truth.
Kant follows a system of science that he had developed in regard 
to epistemological aspects in the Critique of Pure Reason. Here ‘the 
rational’ is contrasted with ‘the empirical’;7 and a distinction is made 
between ‘cognition from pure reason’, the systematic expression of 
which is transcendental philosophy and ‘cognition from empirical 
principles’8 or ‘empirical philosophy’, which includes physics to 
the extent that physics recognises ‘empirical’ principles9. With this 
concept, the idea of enlightenment, in so far as it will be realised 
in the university, reaches its zenith. Kant turns out to be the great 
theorist of the university, but not its actual reformer. His idea of the 
3 Cf. Reinhard Brandt, Universität zwischen Selbst- und Fremdbestimmung. Kants ‘Streit 
der Fakultätenʼ. Mit einem Anhang zu Heideggers ‘Rektoratsredeʼ (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
2003); also Jürgen Mittelstrass, ‘Der Streit der Fakultäten und die Philosophie ,ʼ Kant im Streit 
der Fakultäten, ed. by Volker Gerhardt (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 39–60.
4  Cf. Immanuel Kant, ‘Vorarbeiten zum ersten Abschnitt ,ʼ Gesammelte Schriften, XXIII, 
ed. by Königlich-Preussische (today: Berlin-Brandenburgische) Akademie der Wissenschaften 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1955 [quoted as Akad.-Ausg.]), 430.
5 Immanuel Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten (1798), ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel. Werke in 
sechs Bänden, VI (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964 [quoted as Werke]), 
290. [Religion and Rational Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 255.]
6 Ibidem, 291. [Religion and Rational Theology, 256.]
7 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 863.
8 Ibidem, B 868.
9 Ibidem.
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university and elaboration of it, from the perspective of the faculty 
of philosophy, testifies to a new university self-confidence, and to a 
clear, systematically justified will to reform. However, this is not yet 
realised. The realisation, i.e. the transformation of a theory of the 
university into university structures, is left to Wilhelm von Humboldt 
and the establishment of the University of Berlin.
Humboldt adopts Kant’s definition of the faculty of philosophy as 
the incarnation of the university and connects it to an educational 
idea. According to Humboldt, the transformation of ‘scattered’ 
knowledge into ‘integrated knowledge’, of ‘mere learnedness’ into 
‘scholarly education’, of ‘restless striving’ into ‘wise activity’ should 
occur through science itself, and especially within the framework of 
the faculty of philosophy.10 Here, it is ‘pure’ science, i.e. science for its 
own sake or as an end in itself that, from the perspective of education, 
should be productively linked to society: ‘As soon as one ceases to 
genuinely search for science … everything is lost, irretrievably and 
forever; lost for science … and lost for the state. For only science that 
comes from within, and can be implanted within, transforms the 
character; and for the state, as for mankind in general, the goal is not 
knowing and speaking, but character and action.ʼ11 Besides, the task of 
the university must be ‘to treat science always as a not yet completely 
solved problem, and consequently always to continue in research.ʼ12
With the emphasis on research and the end-in-itself character of 
science a new concept of the scientific emerges. At the same time, the 
older concept of teaching, which was characteristic of the traditional 
university, combines with the new concept of research at the academy, 
for example, at the Royal Society and the Sozietät of Leibniz. The 
concept of a republic of learning (again) gains the same relevance 
as the realisation of a rational ideal of science, and in the sense of a 
commitment to the discovery of truth, also finds its place in teaching. It 
is realised in Humboldt’s University. This means: Humboldt succeeds 
in his central aims that are connected to the principles of research 
in solitude and freedom (i.e. a principle of autonomy) and the unity of 
10  Wilhelm von Humboldt, ‘Theorie der Bildung des Menschen. Bruchstück ,ʼ Gesammelte 
Schriften, I, ed. by Königlich-Preussische (today: Berlin-Brandenburgische) Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Berlin: Behr, 1903 [quoted as Gesammelte Schriften]), 285.
11 Wilhelm von Humboldt, ‘Über die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren 
wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin ,ʼ Gesammelte Schriften, X, 253.
12 Ibidem, 251.
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research and teaching (i.e. a principle of science). Truth and usefulness 
– the one viewed suspiciously, the other left to the academies – find 
their home in the university, not outside of it.
However, it is true that Kant’s idea of the university, which in 
a systematic way, is expressed by distinguishing the faculty of 
philosophy, did not enjoy permanent success even in Humboldt’s 
concept and its realisation. Transforming the idea into an educational 
reorganisation of the university also changed the character of the 
faculty of philosophy. The idea of truth, which is central for Kant, 
turns into a general idea of education and training. And therefore, 
from the very beginning the ‘classical’ university, which is based on 
Kant’s theory of the university as well as Humboldt’s programme of 
education, carries within itself the seed of its dissolution. This can be 
observed in the recent developments of the university – becoming a 
mass-education university and the renewed emigration of research 
to specialised institutions outside the university.
The university today
The university is changing – because both its social and institutional 
environment is changing and because science is changing.13 Its 
Humboldtian essence is under pressure. This development is often 
shaped by political and economic constraints, which as external 
factors, result in inner reorganisation. Things work out whenever 
scientific (i.e. academic) reason prevails by facing external constraints 
with institutional imagination, things work out, where it remains 
idle and the political and eco nomic constraints rule, the university 
is threatened with the loss of its essential na ture, and with it its idea 
and theory. This essential nature consists of an autonomous research 
and teaching organisation along with a concept of education that both 
reflects and provides a critical self-awareness to the modern world, 
which itself is scientific in nature. The keywords are: education, 
commercialisation, autonomy, and universality.
13 In this section, I rely heavily on an earlier publication: Jürgen Mittelstrass, ‘The Future 
of the University ,ʼ European Review, 18 (S1) (2010). Diversification of Higher Education and 
the Academic Profession: Papers from the Hercules Symposium (Turin, Italy, 2009), 183–189.
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First: education. In our world, the pressure to constantly change, 
and as a result, to specialise knowhow is steadily increasing. This 
drive towards specialisation stands in contrast to the simultaneous 
‘technological’ integration of knowledge. However, this integration, 
which is effected by modern information and communication 
technologies, does not lead to a new (or old) unity of the universally 
oriented, and therefore, a universally orienting knower, but rather 
to the creation of the expert. The modern world is a world of experts: 
it is ruled not by a Leibnizian understanding that mirrors the world, 
but by the specialist, in whom almost nothing is reflected. Specialists 
that know more and more about less and less are the opposite of 
universality. Experts focus on the details, which for them, are 
everything.
But this can hardly suffice. In a world of experts, the old ideal of 
unified knowledge, even if it is to be pursued ‘technologically’, loses 
its social function. The ordering of knowledge under the categories 
of universality and disciplinarity, i.e. the responsibility for both the 
whole and the part, begins to pale. And this is especially true when 
the knowledge society in which, at first glance, it seems that the dream 
of the Enlightenment has become reality, begins to view itself as an 
information society. That is why the present reincarnation of the 
knowledge society as an information society threatens to disappoint 
us, at least to the degree that these terms denote an informed society, 
but one that is not oriented. How such oriented knowledge can be 
achieved – I mean one that is not to be confused with mere expert 
knowledge – is thus not a question that can be answered by appealing 
to even more information. It is actually a paradox: the richer our stores 
of information and knowledge, the poorer our ability to orient. But 
this is the ability that the concept of education once stood for.
Education is the expression of a culture in which the rational 
nature of man is realised and, at the same time, education is the 
obverse of culture – culture that has become a form of life, indeed, an 
individual form of life. In this respect, Wilhelm von Humboldt is still 
right. An educated person for him is someone who tries ‘to grasp as 
much of the world as is possible, and who tries to bind it to him as 
tightly as possible .ʼ14 The locus of orientation is the life-world, not the 
conceptual or theoretical world. And this holds true for education as 
14  Humboldt, ‘Theorie der Bildung des Menschen. Bruchstück ,ʼ 283.
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well. Education and orientation are structurally correlated, less in the 
form of science than in the form of life, that is to say, in the form of 
an ability. Based on Humboldt, we could say that it is the ability to 
integrate the world in oneself and to express the world in itself. To put 
it differently: knowledge is, at least when one considers knowledge 
and experience as well as sensibly dealing with them, the universal 
expressed as a particular. And this is something that the university, 
which has been caught up in the Bologna Process and lured into 
managerial and economic ideologies, must learn again.
Second: commercialisation. Today, knowledge has become a 
commodity that has been adopted to the usual market forms.15 It 
does not master the modern world, but becomes something mastered 
by this world and its markets. For a large part of society, knowledge 
has become something that one employs, but does not actually 
practice oneself. The magic word is knowledge management, which 
increases the distance between knowledge and the knower, between 
those who drive knowledge forward and those who use and manage 
knowledge. Generally, this separation is detrimental to knowledge 
and also enables its commodification, i.e. it renders the knower a 
mere provider of services, who is no longer a part of the knowledge 
process. But knowledge that is viewed only as a commodity, which 
is to be acquired, managed, sold, and used, loses its proper essence 
– in Kantian or Humboldtian terms. Thereby, the knowledge society 
is characterised in its self-perception and self-understanding as a 
part of the service society, in which all production processes seem 
to be transformed into mere exchanges. Everyone is in the service of 
someone, including scientists, who no longer understand their craft 
as lying in the production of knowledge and their intelligent labour, 
but see themselves instead as salesmen and managers.
However, knowledge cannot be manufactured in the same way that 
one manufactures ball bearings or soap. But this idea, conditioned by 
a changing way of dealing with knowledge, is the one that is catching 
on. The pressure on research institutions, among them universities, 
to commodify is constantly increasing. In effect, repeated demands 
for so-called knowledge-transfer assume that science is a means of 
preparing knowledge in a form directly amenable to the needs of 
15 See: Jürgen Mittelstrass, ‘Knowledge as a Good: Science, Education, and the 
Commodification of Knowledge ,ʼ Trames, 7 (2003), 227–236.
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the economy, like slugs for the production line. Anyone who dares to 
speak of research in the sense of fundamental research immediately 
evokes the image of ivory towers. And while it is true that the latter 
no longer have a place in the architecture of the modern world, that 
has nothing to do with the particular essence of science in its search 
for the new, and with the special routes that it takes to arrive there. 
We stand before a grave misunderstanding. And if we do not take 
care, our casual and superficial treatment of the sciences will have a 
detrimental effect on them.
Third: autonomy. Every institution, every system which takes its 
fate into its own hands, and does not just think in terms of external 
dependencies, as expressed by the concepts of education and 
commercialisation, must think in terms of planned development, 
starting from an assessment of its current situation, and what its goals 
are. This applies particularly to universities. The modern keywords 
here are profile-building, autonomy, and new university structures.
Of course, in an institution like a university not everything can 
be planned for. The same is true of science, the institutional heart of 
which is the university. Therefore, it is often inferred that planning 
is antagonistic to science and universities, i.e., it is attempting to 
obstruct or revoke the essence of its freedom, the freedom of research 
and teaching. In other words, planning is part of the vocabulary of 
constraints. But this is wrong. What is important is to awaken an 
institutional consciousness in the university that does not think in 
the categories of the already existing and its protection. Instead, it 
should think in the categories of development in which the tried and 
tested old is joined with the desirable new in order to form functional 
organisational structures that foster such thinking.
It will be essential to practice autonomy not just in regard to the 
external, i.e. political autonomy, but also internally, i.e. structural 
autonomy. Structural autonomy demonstrates itself primarily in the 
realisation of structures that are informed by thinking about the 
systematic nature of science; for instance, at the organisational level 
of fields and disciplines, the establishment and abolition of degrees 
and areas of specialisation in research, but also in the implementation 
of quality standards adhering to international standards in research, 
teaching, and the education of junior academic staff. Where this is 
not feasible or not desired, autonomy in the form of an isolationist 
strategy with respect to interference of any sort will lead to structural 
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immobility and ultimately to the university bidding farewell to general 
development. For example, as we all know, science and research are 
increasingly moving trans-disciplinarily beyond disciplinary core areas, 
and institutional structures must take this into account. That means 
that a system of science, including the one provided by or realised 
within a university, must follow the developments in research and 
science – and create an adequate institutional background for this 
– and not, conversely, the development of research or science the 
given system. Many universities have yet to learn this. Becoming a 
managerial uni versity, or whatever the reason of university politics 
might happen to imagine, is of secondary importance.
Fourth: universality and other virtues. A university that steers clear of 
the shortcomings and meets the requirements described above must 
either answer, or be able to demonstrate its institutional response to, 
the following questions: 
1) How much universality should there be in order for a university 
to come into being? Despite all the tendencies towards specialisation, 
academic knowledge is something that can only grow on a field that 
everyone tends. Great achievements require not only specialised 
knowledge, but also close contact with other areas. Gottlob Frege 
was a mathematician and philosopher, Max Weber a sociologist 
and historian, Max Delbrück a biologist and physicist. Disciplinary 
boundaries do not determine actual achievements here. On the 
contrary, these boundaries need to be overcome if great achievements 
are to result. This is especially true in modern developments. New 
insights most often form on the edges of fields and disciplines, on the 
borders with their neighbours, and not at the core where textbook 
knowledge is at home. Thus universality, in its institutional form 
of fields and disciplines, cannot be arbitrarily restricted. In other 
words, research and teaching can only thrive to a certain degree in 
departmental or disciplinary greenhouses. Access to the (university’s) 
external environments must remain open, and be accessible in both 
directions. One must be able to get outside when one is looking for 
complementary knowledge, and someone else with the same wish 
must be able to get in. This means that the university must maintain 
its claim to universality.
2) How much disciplinarity must there be in order for trans-
disciplinarity to have a chance? The bearers of the institutional unity 
of research and teaching, in regard to which the university will 
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continue to define itself in the future, are still the disciplines, even 
if the systematic academic memory of what disciplines are, what they 
can achieve, and what distinguishes them from departmentalised 
structures has grown somewhat faint over time. Disciplines are 
the systematic forms in which academic knowledge, including that 
of departments and faculties, constitutes itself. And they are also 
the medium in which academic learning operates. Disciplines also 
remain a prerequisite for transdisciplinary forms of work and of 
cognition. There can be no transdisciplinary forms of work if there 
is a lack of diverse disciplines in research and teaching. In such a 
situation, there will be none of the intellectual progress that results 
from the increased cooperation among and beyond various fields 
and disciplines. At the same time, this means that the university 
presupposes a multi-disciplinary character (or multiversity), i.e. a 
living part of that universality that once determined the development 
of the university.
3) How much plurality is necessary for a university identity to exist? 
Disciplinary plurality bestows a sense of self upon the university, a 
sense of being a real university. If this plurality is missing, this sense 
of being a university will not develop, but merely that of being a 
school. In such a case, the unity of research and teaching defines itself 
by what a circumscribed part of academia knows. In consequence, it is 
defined by a closed form of research, and not by the open one, which 
is characterised today by a transdisciplinary perspective among other 
things. The paradigm of the school replaces that of the university. 
The university as an institution of teaching displaces the university 
as a research institution; the unity of research and teaching loses its 
content and coagulates in rhetoric.
4) How much quality is needed for excellence to emerge? According 
to the Humboldt principle, universities are institutions of higher 
learning in the sense that university teaching develops out of 
university research, and remains connected during teaching and 
learning. If teaching and learning are disconnected from research, 
or remain connected to the latter only through the memory of the 
teacher’s own learning, terms such as ‘academic’ and ‘scientific’, or the 
German wissenschaftlich lose their meaning. In this case, university 
teaching and learning are no longer distinguished from other, non-
academic teaching and learning. Academic achievement of a high 
calibre and scientific excellence are once again only possible in an 
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environment that is conducive to achievement and that stimulates 
and furthers academic achievement through academic achievement 
itself. Although mediocre conditions do not necessarily exclude high 
levels of achievement, nor occasional feats of excellence, these will 
remain the exception. It is more likely that mediocre conditions are 
a programme for academic mediocrity or as the old saying goes, 
‘second-rate people hire third-rate ones’, thereby ensuring that the 
tree next door does not grow too tall. In other words, there must be a 
great deal of academic quality in one place if academic excellence is 
to be developed. And this quality cannot be found in isolated fields 
or disciplinary islands that one occupies alone, but in an academic 
and scientific context which is defined by quality and excellence. 
Differentiation and diversification are the engines that drive the 
development of the university, and thus, of higher education.
Conclusion
Behind institutions we find ideas that sustain them over time and 
make them unique and singular. What is the idea that sustains the 
university today? This question is unwelcome. The problem is that 
the university no longer has an idea. The Bologna Process and the 
managerial university are not a fit answer. Bologna transforms the 
university into a school, the managerial university turns it into 
one enterprise among many others. But the university is not just 
any school – that much of Humboldt needs to be preserved – and 
the university is not just an enterprise – that much Kant has to be 
preserved. However, this no longer seems to be true. Today wherever 
politicians, as well as scientists, meet to discuss the future of the 
university, the topic is always exclusively the next step in the Bologna 
Process and university management. Anyone calling for an idea or 
theory of the university is viewed as an incorrigible idealist. But isn’t 
it precisely the absence of suitably focused idealism that makes us so 
credulous and unimaginative? The history of the university teaches 
us that it is always awakened by fascinating models, and Kant and 
Humboldt are two examples. A critical look at the present university 
teaches us that such models are lacking – and are urgently needed. 
One does not need to evoke the end of history in order to see that the 
end of the university is approaching. Let us not let things go that far.
26 Jürgen Mittelstr ass
Jürgen Mittelstrass: The Idea of The UnIversITy: hIsTory and faTe
Keywords: hIsTory of The UnIversITy; GoTTfrIed WIlhelm leIbnIz; 
ImmanUel KanT; WIlhelm von hUmboldT; essence of edUcaTIon  
Jürgen Mittelstrass (PhD in Philosophy in 1961, University of 
Erlangen) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Constance 
from 1970 until 2005, Director of the Centre for Philosophy of Science 
from 1990 until 2005. Since 2015 Honorary Professor of Philosophy at 
the University of Salzburg; 1985–1990 Member of the German Science 
Council; 1995–1998 Member of the German Chancellor’s Council 
for Research, Technology, and Innovation; 2005–2015 Chairman 
of the Austrian Science Council (Vienna); 1997–1999 President of 
the German Philosophical Association; 2002–2007 President of the 
Academia Europaea (London); 1989 Leibniz Prize of the German 
Research Society; 1998 Lorenz Oken Medal of the Society of German 
Scientists and Physicians; 2012 Nicholas Rescher Prize for Systematic 
Philosophy. Main research areas include: epistemology, history and 
philosophy of science, philosophy of language. Recent publications 
include: Die Haeuser des Wissens (1998), Wissen und Grenzen (2001); 
Leibniz und Kant (2011), Die griechische Denkform (2014). He is also 
editor of the Enzyklopaedie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, 4 vols. 
(1980–1996), second edition 8 vols. (2005–2018).
